Terrorism represents a creeping threat to western European societies. It aims at the very heart of democratic institutions. In most cases its immediate impact on the average individual is not considered sufficient, in Western Europe
The four persons who had been subjected to prolonged detention filed a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights alleging that Britain had violated several paragraphs of Article 5 of the Convention, among these para.3, because, after their arrest, they had not been taken promptly before a judge (or released). 8 The European It is regarded as pan of the settled case-law of the Court that the adverb "promptly" -which has a more elastic meaning than the corresponding French term "aussitot" -does not mean "immediately"; rather it must be interpreted according to the circumstances of each case.
11 Moreover, while there have been cases where the Court held that the length of police custody was excessive, 12 the Court has never clearly specified the maximum limit acceptable under the Convention. 1 3
In contrast, the Commission which has its own case-law on the matter has determined that a four day time limit (two days plus two), currently in force in most Member States, is compatible with the Convention. Moreover, on one occasion it deemed acceptable a with a view to taking the arrestce before a judge, if the suspicions prove founded. This is confinned by the Court in this very case, para. S3. The applicants had also alleged the violation of paras. l(c), 4 period of five days due to exceptional circumstances (the arrestee was hospitalized and thus could not be brought before the judge).
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In the Brogan case the Commission and the Court disagreed exactly on the maximum duration of the custody period. In accordance with its previous case-law, the Commission focused on the actual length of detention and on the special situation created by the terrorist threat, maintaining that in normal circumstances the police should not detain anyone for more than four days without judicial control. Nonetheless, in its Brogan opinion the Commission suggested that slightly longer periods could be accepted in situations justifying greater restrictions on individual rights and thus requiring greater sacrifice on the part of individuals. 15 Hence, according to the Commission, the limit of four days applies only in normal cases; a different (possibly longer) limit applies to special cases. Moreover, the Commission seems to take it for granted that the existence of a danger to society and democratic institutions is in itself sufficient to justify a limitation on individual rights. It does not seem to require proof that the limitation proposed is indeed effective in countering the threat (or, to put it differently, on whether the same goal could not as efficiently be pursued by other means, while fully applying the Convention's provisions).
The Court did not adopt the Commission's line of reasoning. Instead, it said that the flexibility inherent in the concept of "promptness" is very limited since too broad an interpretation would undermine the very right protected. This was deemed particularly true in the instant case because the goals allegedly to be achieved by a longer detention could be attained just as well by imposing -with appropriate procedural precautions -judicial control over the detention. '* The Court thus clearly rejected the Commission's view. In essence, it asserted that even though the term "promptly" can be elastically construed, there is a maximum period of detention compatible with the Convention and that any extension beyond the maximum limit violates individuals' right to personal freedom. And while the Court declined to fix the maximum detention period, it unequivocally stated that it must be conceived of as an absolute, not as an average period applicable only in normal circumstances. This means that in normal cases the authorities should stay well below that limit; the limit should only be reached when strictly necessary.
17
The Court did not offer a detailed explanation as to why it did not share the Commission's view. Some useful comments can, however, be made. The application of the concept of "special circumstances" to Article 5 clearly shows that the Commission regards it preferable to allow states a greater freedom in the choice of the measures they deem appropriate to counter terrorism, rather than have them resort to Article 15. By interpreting Article 5 flexibly, that is, by creating a distinction between normal and special cases, the The Commission has assessed these periods against the background of its case-law according to which a person should not be detained in normal cases for more than four days without being brought before a judicial authority. The Commission is aware, however, that it must strike a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the general interest of the community. _. In so doing, the Commission takes into account that the struggle against terrorism may require a particular measure of sacrifice by each citizen in order to protect the community as a whole against such crimes..'* Rep. of the Comm., para. 106. See case of Brogan, supra note I, para. 61.
Commission gives states this freedom. In so doing, the Commission seeks to ensure the integral application of the Convention wherever and whenever possible (including in states facing difficult situations), even if at the cost of a relative strain on some of its provisions. In other words, in the opinion of the Commission, in situations of terrorism or risks to institutional stability it is better to have all of the Convention's provisions in force, even if this means guaranteeing some rights (the right to personal freedom, in the present case) in a somewhat attenuated form, than for some of these rights to be suspended outright.
There are some difficulties, in my opinion, with this view: I will try to point them out, and to explain why, apart from the difficulties, it is not a desirable view and has rightly been rejected by die Court.
I have already mentioned that, in a previous case, the Commission had accepted a period of detention of five days because at some point during the detention period the arrestee had to be hospitalized. In the Brogan case this precedent enabled the Commission to assert that the limit of four days only applies to normal cases, whereas in the present case the existence of a special situation, which "requir[ed] a particular measure of sacrifice by each citizen in order to protect the Community as a whole," justified the application of a slightly longer limit. The natural extension of this line of reasoning is that, if each abnormal situation permits the application of a different maximum limit, every individual must expect, owing to some change of circumstances, either a limitation or an enlargement of his or her rights and freedoms under the Convention.
I think it is unwarranted, on the basis of the hospitalization case, to distinguish, in the context of Article 5, between "normal" and "special" cases and to apply to the latter a looser deadline. It is one thing to note the exceptional character of one case, and to create an exception due to the specific featwes of that case, where the exception remains limited, its future application to other cases improbable. It is entirely another thing to make the exception depend upon the circumstances, such as the political climate, in which the case is situated. What makes this case exceptional is not its special features but its being situated in those circumstances (e.g. terrorism). Applying a longer limit to an entire category of cases, all falling under that exceptional situation, would amount in practice to a modification of the norm. 1 8 Such an interpretation is incompatible with the structure of Article S, which includes an exhaustive list of the admissible exceptions to the right to personal freedom and makes no distinction as regards special situations.
A differentiation between "normal" and "special" situations also strikes at the very ratio of the regulation concerning police custody in the Convention. The limited duration of police custody under the Convention embodies a compromise between the police's need to detain suspects in order to verify the well-foundedness of their suspicions, and individuals' right not to be unduly detained. 1 9 Its factual premise is a "reasonable suspicion" which may nonetheless prove unfounded. A strict limitation on these powers enables the police to make the necessary checks while insuring that, where suspicions prove groundless, the arrestee is not taxed too heavily.20 The increased gravity of the The corollary of this point is that the police are obliged to release the anestee if the arrest is not confirmed by the competent authorities (even when they are convinced of his guilt) but cannot be held responsible for the arrest in cases where the suspicions prove unfounded. See, suspected offence does not increase the likelihood that the suspect has committed it The right of persons to have their position speedily defined, or be released, should be the same regardless of the crime at issue since a factual uncertainty, being die crux of die matter, has no relation to the gravity of an offence. Admitting longer police custody for those suspected of terrorist offences would alter the balance in favour of the police authorities, conferring on them more sweeping powers and the authority to decide when to use them. In practice the police -this is to say one of the parties to the compromisewould have the power to decide, exclusively upon their own evaluation of the facts, whose freedom to restrict more and whose less before being subjected to an external check. This is precisely what the provision contained in para. 3 is meant to avoid.
In theory anyone could be arrested on the basis of a suspicion which later proves unfounded. This has led the Commission to say that the presence of a terrorist threat requires a greater sacrifice of everybody's freedom. 2 1 According to the Commission, if an individual is arrested, he or she should accept being detained a little longer before being brought before a judge, even though innocent, for the sake of a more effective struggle against terrorism. But, it is precisely in these situations, when the police are likely to arrest more people purely on suspicion, that guarantees to personal freedom should be strengthened, rather than weakened. This would lower the risk of abuses, and reduce the stress for a greater number of innocent people who inevitably end up being arrested.
22

III.
It is now clear that the structure and purpose of Article 5 do not allow a more "elastic" interpretation, for this could lead to a de facto erosion of the right protected. The issue raised by this case, however, is not only the mere length of the police detention. This was very clearly pointed out in the partly dissenting opinion of four members of the Commission. Undoubtedly, an effective struggle against terrorism -a particularly serious class of organized crime -requires special powers and a certain prolongation of pretrial detention for the purpose of gathering the necessary evidence. But is the absence of judicial control also necessary to achieve this goal? In other words, is it necessary to sac- "In the opinion of the majority, the struggle against terrorism justifies that all citizens should accept the risk of being detained for some time beyond four days without being brought before a judge. We cannot accept this position. It is precisely in situations where wider powers of arrest are conferred on the authorities to cope with an organised terrorist threat that the need for judicial control against the abuse of power is greatest. It cannot be said that the need for judicial control is less than in respect of detention for ordinary criminal offences. The Government has alluded to special problems which exist when suspected terrorists are arrested and detained... We agree that account must be taken of these problems but it has not been shown that they exclude judicial control of detention." (pp. 24-5).
rifice the guarantees associated with judicial control of detention in order to fight terrorism more effectively?
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If it is not disputed that a longer pre-trial detention may often be necessary in terrorist cases, attention must be drawn to the individuals who may authorize the extensions. This is a rather delicate question because it entails a judgment on the different procedural systems of Member States. The Convention clearly requires that the authority entitled to remand the arrestee in custody must have "judicial power." This provision was further clarified in the Schiesser case where the Court stated that the authority must "be independent of the executive and the parties.'^4 The 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act, however, provides that the authorization to extend detention beyond 48 hours be given by the Secretary of State,25 a member of the executive.
In its pleadings the British government did not question the fact that the Convention requires detention extensions to be authorized by a "judicial power" but instead asserted that a modification of the legislation in this direction would be undesirable (though not impossible). 26 In rejecting the British Government's view, the Court applied the principle according to which a state may not plead "internal reasons" to justify its non-compliance with its international obligations.
27 It should not be forgotten, however, that the British procedural system (especially as amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England and Wales) 28 tallies extremely well with the requirements of the Convention so that, for instance, problems of unreasonable length of pre-trial detention (unlike in many other Member States) rarely surface in the U.K. This is due precisely to the "accusatorial" character of British procedure, which prevents the police from charging a suspect without sufficient evidence, but compels them to take him or her to trial as soon as a charge is made. It is therefore easy to understand why the British government is so reluctant to change its legislation. From Britain's viewpoint, it is preferable to extend See, partly dissenting opinion, supra note 22.
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Li the Schiesser case, the Court asserted that the authority must be independent of the executive and of the parties, which does not mean, however, that he may not to some extent be subordinate to other officers who enjoy similar independence: also he must himself hear the individual who has been brought before him; finally he must be under the obligation to review the circumstances militating for or against detention and to decide, by reference to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to justify detention, or to order release if there are no such reasons. PubL Q. A/34 paras. 26-31.
•" See, supra note 8.
See a little the length of detention without charge -knowing however that the situation of the detainee is going to be speedily defined once the charge is made -and provide a form of "imperfect" control on the detention, rather than change a fundamental of its criminal procedure: the lack of inquisitorial powers of the judiciary. But if it had accepted Britain's argument, the Court would have set a very dangerous precedent, enabling states (including those without an "accusatorial" system of criminal procedure) to extend the police powers of detention without judicial control much beyond the limits now generally considered acceptable. The question is then whether the internal coherence of the British system is worth weakening in the whole of Europe of the entire body of legal regulations on personal freedom. The Court rightly said it is not IV.
As I said before, apart from the difficulties stemming from the structure of Article 5, which, as I have discussed, does not permit flexible interpretations, I also have some doubts about whether the Commission's tendency to give states a wider discretionary power in order to ensure the full application of the Convention whenever possible is desirable altogether.
In Klass, both the Commission and the Court took full account of the state's pressing need to combat terrorism effectively and were therefore willing to interpret some Convention provisions more flexibly (Article 8 in that case). 29 In Brogan, the Commission seemed willing to extend this practice to norms, like Article 5, which -in contrast to articles of the Convention containing concepts such as public order or national securitydo not permit the elastic interpretation these "clawback clauses" render possible. The Court has blocked this, confirming the higher degree of rigidity of certain provisions compared to others, due to the greater importance of the right protected. This rigidity implies that the rules may not be stretched in such a way as to adapt to the situation of each Member State. Rather, they represent a yardstick to which all Members must adjust, even in the presence of scourges such as terrorism. Consequently, if the threat becomes so strong as to require a limitation of that right, states must resort to Article IS.
It is certainly true that, in the short term, the remedy may appear worse than the evil, insofar as it entails the outright suspension (rather than the mere limitation) of a fundamental right in that country. Nonetheless, a limited suspension of that right, by definition temporary, has the advantage of enabling a state to take the measures it deems necessary and, at the same time, of insuring that the same right is fully protected in the other Member States; resort to Article IS thus protects a fundamental right from erosion by "elastic" interpretations and from potential Member State abuses of any increased degree of discretion. The integrity and full application of a fundamental right such as the right to personal freedom is thereby preserved for the present and for the future to the greater advantage of individuals in the whole of Western Europe.
Thus, shortly after the Brogan judgment, the government of the United Kingdom made a declaration by which it availed itself of the right of derogation conferred by Arti- .d.a.) , the Secretary of State for the Home Department informed Parliament on 6 December 1988 that, against the background of the terrorist campaign, and the over-riding need to bring terrorists to justice, the Government did not believe that the maximum period of detention should be reduced. He informed Parliament that the Government were examining the matter with a view to responding to the judgment On 22 December 1988, the Secretary of State further informed Parliament that it remained the Government's wish, if it could be achieved, to find a judicial process under which extended detention might be reviewed and where appropriate authorised by a judge or other judicial officer. But a further period of reflection and consultation was necessary before the Government could bring forward a firm and final view. ... Since the judgment of 29 November 1988 as well as previously, the Government has found it necessary to continue to exercise, in relation to terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, the powers described above enabling further detention without charge, for periods up to five days, on the authority of the Secretary of State, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation to enable necessary enquiries and investigations properly to be completed in order to decide whether criminal proceedings should be instituted. To the extent that the exercise of these powers may be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by the Convention the Government has availed itself of the right of derogation conferred by Article 1S.1 of the Convention and will continue to do so until further notice." European Commission of Human Rights, Minutes of the plenary session held in Strasbourg from 16 to 20 January 1989, DH (89)1 (Dei.). Appendix VI at 10.
